Interesting chapter from Alexander Bick who led the NSC's Russia-Ukraine Tiger Team on the Biden administration's thinking during the Russian buildup: "Over the fall, the administration was trying to balance two contradictory objectives—to ensure that Ukraine had the capabilities to defend itself, while avoiding any steps that might increase the likelihood of an invasion or affix blame on the United States. As Colin Kahl, then under secretary of defense for policy, later put it, 'we didn’t want to inadvertently speed up the Russian clock, incentivize Putin, or give him a pretext to make a decision he had not made. Us leaning too far forward could create dynamics either within the alliance or as we were trying to build world opinion against the Russians that made us look like we were the provocateurs.'" muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_edite…
@DeeGLloyd @RALee85 @AVindman @AVindman also predicted—again, quite accurately—that the politics were going to change, and thus time was of the essence. How no one else foresaw this—also quite predictable—outcome is beyond maddening