Pavel Shabarkin @shabarkin

We're excited to be contributing $50,000 to the Ethereum Security QF matching pool! Researchers, auditors, and protocol-level contributors are what keep Ethereum resilient for the future. Every donation backing them now goes further.

Giveth @Giveth

4 weeks ago

We’re happy to share that @Quantstamp is contributing $50,000 to the Ethereum Security QF matching pool 🛡️ A global leader in blockchain security, Quantstamp has conducted 1,300+ audits and secured $500B+ in digital assets since 2017, working across smart contracts, L1s, and web

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AI will be closing the gap of vulnerability spread humans were missing during previous cycles. Not saying it will be bullet proof but we can find more issues in old software. mtlynch.io/claude-code-fo…

@om_patel5 Why not using codex then? I like Claude’s default more for its open explanation of the topic otherwise I pick codex which does it naturally.

if LLMs are the main threat for cyber attacks, then probably the best defense is just littering everything with tons of prompt injections. Hack the LLMs while they try to hack your system. Whenever they hit the wrong port, return a prompt injection. Whenever there's a JSON that accepts extra fields, add prompt injection there. Hidden prompt injection in every html tag. Smart contracts with utf encoded prompt injection in the bytecode. This is not advice -- just public brainstorming of research ideas.

CAREFUL: anthropic built a signature system into claude code. every API request gets signed with a cch= hash thats computed in compiled zig code if you recompile the client yourself it just sends zeros instead. they can instantly tell its not legit right now you literally can't use your anthropic sub on ANY third party tool. only official claude code or pay for api credits separately currently decompiling the official binary to reverse this - would be huge for all third party clients like opencode, openclaw etc to fully bypass anthropic enforcement and actually use the tokens you're already paying for

zerodayclock.com

My startup was hacked! I launched my own travel eSIM service, eSIMPal It started making money, the users were happy, and all was good, but today I woke up to a hacked website Somebody managed to get three 50 (!) GB eSIMs for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for free, and we started using them heavily I wired up Claude, and we discovered the issue: the user could pass a parameter from the client to the server and make the eSIM cost 0 dollars I fixed the issue and blocked this user, and he only managed to use 5 GB worth of data The internet is full of sharks, boys – triple test all the payment-related code, make sure different LLMs cross-check each other's work Now I'm writing code with GPT-5.4 and making Opus 4.6 review everything for vulnerabilities And my hacker bro, if you are reading this, I'll get you your Saudi eSIM, don't worry Use the promo code IHACKEDESIMPAL for 10% off and chill

Was going to write something like this post months ago, injective was horrible during a crit I found in their protocol 3 months ago and was approved to be at leat High by Immunefi. But I don't like to publicly shame projects, I just see their slow and unresponsive and dismissive behaviour especially with reasons that don't make sense and move on and not even bother looking at their codebase.

f4lc0n @al_f4lc0n

3 months ago

I Saved Injective's $500M. They Pay Me $50K. I like hunting bugs on @immunefi . I'm decent at it. - #1 — Attackathon | Stacks - #2 — Attackathon | Stacks II - #1 — Attackathon | XRPL Lending Protocol - 1 Critical and 1 High from bug bounties (not counting this one) Life was

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@al_f4lc0n @immunefi I understand the struggle! Thank you for sharing your story!

I Saved Injective's $500M. They Pay Me $50K. I like hunting bugs on @immunefi . I'm decent at it. - #1 — Attackathon | Stacks - #2 — Attackathon | Stacks II - #1 — Attackathon | XRPL Lending Protocol - 1 Critical and 1 High from bug bounties (not counting this one) Life was good. Then I found a Critical vulnerability in @injective . This vulnerability allowed any user to directly drain any account on the chain. No special permissions needed. Over $500M in on-chain assets were at risk. I reported it through Immunefi. The next day, a mainnet upgrade to fix the bug went to governance vote. The Injective team clearly understood the severity. Then — silence. For 3 months. No follow up. No technical discussion. Nothing. A few days ago, they notified me of their decision: $50K. The maximum payout for a Critical vulnerability in their bug bounty program is $500K. I disputed it. Silence again. No explanation for the reduced payout. No explanation for the 3 month ghost. No conversation at all. To be clear: the $50K has not been paid either. I've seen others share bad experiences with bug bounty payouts recently. I never thought it would happen to me. I can't force them to do the right thing. But I won't let this be forgotten. I will dedicate 10% of all my future bug bounty earnings to making sure this story stays visible — until Injective pays what I deserve. Full Technical Report: github.com/injective-wall…

1/ By now, anyone paying attention knows where AI cognition is landing. A 🧵on where this is all going.

6/ The AI auditor narrative isn't putting us out of business. It's shrinking the supply of who can do what matters and expanding the demand to pay for it.

sent this to the team today everything great comes from being able to delay gratification for as long as possible and it feels like we're collectively losing our ability to do that

@thdxr @kitlangton opencode generated those snapshots.

@kitlangton @thdxr 691 | .run() SQLiteError: database or disk is full code: SQLITE_FULL at #run (bun:sqlite:185:20) at (src/session/index.ts:691:10) at run (node:async_hooks:62:22) at use (src/storage/db.ts:136:28) at (src/session/index.ts:682:14) (src/session/processor.ts:419:2

@thdxr @kitlangton you are right, somehow 800gb+ of ssd got filled. investigating...

we spoke to a company today who's security team is so concerned by ai code they're considering banning ai tools your first reaction might be "they're gonna get left behind" but if you are practical their concerns aren't invalid if you are a huge multi national org with tens of thousands of employees and they just got a button that appears to do their work, it's gonna get pushed a lot and the process around knowing what is making it to production is totally melting being honest we're all getting a bit lazier see that kiro related aws outage as a real life example so they're genuinely arguing over how much this is going to be allowed esp since the net productivity gains for the average dev seem to be pretty low

One underrated downside of LLMs getting better is that they're quietly killing team communication during audits. Before, you'd ask a teammate if they understood a specific mechanism, or bounce questions about the codebase off each other. Now, most of the time you're better off just asking your LLM directly. The set of questions still worth asking your teammates (or even the client) instead of your LLM is shrinking fast.

sharing one of our findings for @Uniswap V4 in total, we found 3 live bugs (2 in CCA and 1 in Core) with @therealgregoAI all reported, confirmed, and fixed humble shout out to the uniswap team as being great to work with

GregoAI @therealgregoAI

3 months ago

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