Zoe Iris Levornik @_the_IrIs

The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on ten individuals who operated a courier network that transferred hundreds of millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah. The funds were physically transported on commercial flights between Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon, with currency exchangers, shell companies, and accounts linked to the Quds Force helping to conceal the activity. The use of couriers is not new. As we have previously reported, Turkey serves as a key hub in Iran’s network for transferring funds to Hezbollah, particularly following the disruption of direct routes from Iran and the overland corridor through Syria. In our assessment, the scale of the activity has declined recently, but the route remains active. The couriers are only one part of the system. The cash is integrated into a network of currency exchangers and hawala transfers, enabling value to be transferred between countries without banking records or clear digital traces. The investigation was conducted in coordination with the Turkish authorities, and therefore should not be taken as evidence of the Turkish state’s involvement. Nevertheless, the scale of the activity points to significant oversight gaps. Exposing the network is an achievement, but as long as aviation and currency-exchange infrastructure and intermediary companies continue to operate, Iran will be able to replace the couriers and continue channeling funds toward rebuilding Hezbollah’s military and civilian capabilities. Read the full article>> israel-alma.org/turkey-as-a-hu…

On August 10, it was reported that understandings had been reached to remove nuclear material from “Site 99” in Syria. Eight days later, Syria and the IAEA announced that the material declared by Damascus would remain in Syrian custody under international safeguards. It has not yet been clarified whether the reports refer to the same site and the same stockpile. According to reports, the material is linked to the Assad regime’s clandestine al-Kibar nuclear program and likely includes uranium in the form of yellowcake. It is not suitable for direct use in a nuclear weapon, but in hostile hands, it could be used for smuggling, extortion, or radiological terrorism. Several actors must be considered in this context: Iran, ISIS, criminal elements, and even potential “rogue” actors within the forces of the al-Sharaa regime. A future scenario in which the regime itself adopts a more radical course, restricts oversight, or attempts to use the material as political and security leverage must also be considered. Cooperation with the IAEA is a positive step, but the agency does not secure the sites. Responsibility remains in the hands of a state that is still unstable. Read the full article>> israel-alma.org/the-nuclear-ma…

Could Lebanon’s potential new role in oil transit create a new smuggling route for Iran? Lebanon is preparing to serve as a transit, storage, and re-export hub for crude oil and petroleum products from Iraq. The initiative offers clear economic benefits — but it also increases the security risk. Every additional border crossing, tanker route, storage facility, and port creates a potential platform for Iran and Hezbollah’s smuggling infrastructure. The threat is not theoretical: in July, Syrian authorities thwarted the smuggling of advanced weapons intended for Hezbollah, which were concealed inside an oil tanker traveling along the commercial route to Baniyas. We assess that Iran will continue to exploit legitimate oil traffic as cover for weapons smuggling. Without strict oversight and transparency throughout the supply chain, this constitutes an effective platform for rebuilding its military capabilities. Read the full article: israel-alma.org/lebanon-as-a-r…

The Russian Presence in Syria: From Military Control to a Limited Partnership—Updated Situation Report as of August 10, 2026. The new arrangement at Hmeimim and Tartus points to a shift from bases under independent Russian control to a limited and conditional presence: civilian infrastructure will be returned to Syrian administration, while the military facilities will be converted into joint training centers. Moscow is losing military autonomy but retaining influence through military training, weapons maintenance, economic ties, and its international standing. From Israel’s perspective, the change may slightly reduce the potential risk of direct friction with Russian forces—but it does not render the deconfliction mechanisms unnecessary. Read the full article>> israel-alma.org/the-russian-pr…

Syria: Secret Understandings to Remove Nuclear Material from “Site 99” According to Axios, the U.S., Israel and Syria’s new government reached secret understandings for the IAEA to remove yellowcake and other nuclear materials reportedly left from Syria’s covert al-Kibar reactor project. In August 2023, we reported on Project 99, whose site is located in the Tell Qartal area between Hama and Homs. According to the open-source materials available to us at the time, the site was linked to ballistic missile production under Institute 4000 of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS), with Iranian and North Korean involvement. At this stage, there is no information confirming that “Site 99,” referenced in the Axios report, is the same site identified by the Alma Center. However, in terms of storage requirements, “yellowcake” can be stored almost anywhere. Removing the material under IAEA supervision could reduce a potentially clear and immediate security threat to Israel. israel-alma.org/syria-secret-u…

@zorenste מגלגלים אחראיות כרגיל

The Council for the South is a Lebanese government body responsible for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. However, for decades it has been associated with the Amal Movement and operates in an environment where the Amal–Hezbollah alliance exercises extensive political and municipal influence. This creates a system in which state funds and international assistance address genuine needs but may also strengthen Amal’s patronage networks, deepen residents’ dependence on Hezbollah, and help restore its civilian foothold and even its military capabilities. The reconstruction of southern Lebanon is therefore not merely about rebuilding homes and infrastructure, it is also a struggle over sovereignty, influence, and legitimacy. The main interest is not to prevent reconstruction, but to ensure that it is conducted transparently and under supervision, strengthens the Lebanese state, and does not lay the groundwork for Hezbollah’s renewed entrenchment and the next conflict. Read the full article: israel-alma.org/the-council-fo…

@zorenste 🤣🤣

The new oil route from Iraq to Syria was designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz—but it could also become a new smuggling route for Iran. Since April, hundreds of oil tanker trucks have passed daily through the al-Waleed–al-Tanf crossing on their way to the port of Baniyas. In June and July alone, approximately 1.42 million barrels of Iraqi fuel oil destined for the U.S. market were loaded at the port, a quantity that required an estimated 7,100 tanker trucks to transport. Amid the growing volume of commercial traffic, an attempt to smuggle advanced weapons to Hezbollah concealed inside an oil tanker—including FPV drones, anti-tank missiles, and components for Iranian cruise missiles—has already been thwarted. According to local reports, previous smuggling attempts successfully reached their destination. The U.S. withdrawal from al-Tanf, weak border oversight, and the pro-Iranian presence in Iraq are together creating an operational opportunity for Iran. Washington should not obstruct trade, but it should condition its support for expanding the corridor on transparency, technological scanning, and strict oversight. Without appropriate safeguards, a route intended to reduce Iranian leverage in the Strait of Hormuz could become Hezbollah’s new reconstruction route. Read the full article: israel-alma.org/the-new-oil-ro…

The new Syrian parliament has begun its work—another step in building state institutions following the fall of the Assad regime, but not yet a transition to representative democracy. The composition of the parliamentary leadership combines legal and academic expertise, former opposition figures, individuals who emerged from Idlib’s governing institutions, and female and Christian representation. However, none of the parliament’s 210 members were elected in direct general elections: 140 were selected through regional electoral bodies, while 70 were personally appointed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The true test will not be the parliament’s mere existence, but its ability to operate independently, oversee the executive branch, and allow genuine criticism - and, in the future, to pave the way for general, direct, and equal elections. Read the full article: israel-alma.org/syrias-parliam…

Firm embrace and may the Schwarz be with you always 🤍

Zoe Iris Levornik @_the_IrIs

a month ago

@MelBrooks thank you for the laughter you brought into my life as a child and thank you for being such an inspiration to me as an adult. I don't use the word inspiration often but you inspired me to be a funny little Jew. I wish I could tell you in person what you mean to me.

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@MelBrooks thank you for the laughter you brought into my life as a child and thank you for being such an inspiration to me as an adult. I don't use the word inspiration often but you inspired me to be a funny little Jew. I wish I could tell you in person what you mean to me.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Joe Rajji declared Iran's designated ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, persona non grata as early as March 2026. Now, amid reports that the Directorate General of General Security is considering extending his residency permit, the question arises whether a security agency aligned with the Shiite camp will obstruct the implementation of the Foreign Ministry's decision. The Directorate General of General Security is headed by Hassan Choucair, who is affiliated with the Amal Movement, and in recent years, allegations of Hezbollah's infiltration of the agency have intensified. If Sheibani's residency permit is indeed extended despite the Foreign Ministry's position, it would provide further evidence of the ability of actors aligned with the Iranian axis to influence state institutions and circumvent official government decisions through administrative and security mechanisms. The Sheibani affair is not merely a diplomatic dispute—it is a real test of whether Lebanon's state institutions are capable of enforcing the country's sovereignty in the face of the influence wielded by Iran and Hezbollah. israel-alma.org/another-test-o…

The new sanctions imposed by the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) do not reveal a new Hezbollah infrastructure. Rather, they provide an important insight into the internal structure of the financial system on which the organization relies. The network includes Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank, Bayt al-Mal, the Central Finance Unit (Unit 104), as well as civilian companies, financial professionals, and a network of mechanisms designed to circumvent sanctions and continue managing the organization's funds. Hezbollah's financial system is not merely a source of funding for its military activities. It also enables the organization to finance its welfare network, propaganda apparatus, reconstruction efforts, and force build-up, making it one of Hezbollah's principal sources of strength. Read the full report: israel-alma.org/behind-hezboll…

Syria's new parliament has been completed, yet Suwayda Province remains the only region where no elections were held. Instead, President Ahmad al-Sharaa appointed two representatives to parliament, a move intended to provide the province with formal representation, while also highlighting the governance limitations of the new regime. These appointments reflect Damascus's attempt to consolidate its authority through cooperation with supportive local elites rather than relying on elections in a province where tensions with the Druze population remain high and the central government's legitimacy is still limited. Read the full article: israel-alma.org/suwayda-in-par…

Hezbollah does not use Ashura merely as a religious observance, it uses it as a strategic tool to reinforce its power. Even after the recent war and the significant damage it sustained, the organization continues to invest substantial resources in organizing dozens of processions, ceremonies, and commemorative events across Lebanon to project continuity, resilience, and the message that its public support base remains intact. The Ashura commemorations demonstrate that, for Hezbollah, civilian and religious activity is not secondary to its military capabilities. Rather, it is a central component of the organization's influence strategy, enabling it to mobilize support, reinforce its ideological identity, and preserve the public legitimacy of the "Resistance." Read the full article: israel-alma.org/hezbollah-mark…

A statement attributed to the Turkish ambassador to #Lebanon, according to which Ankara supports Hezbollah’s “resistance role” and opposes pressure on #Syria to act against the organization, may indicate a broader trend in Turkish policy. Despite the historical rivalry between #Turkey and #Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war, Sunni-led Ankara continues to act pragmatically to advance its regional influence—including by maintaining channels of communication with actors associated with the Shiite “Axis of Resistance.” For Israel, this may signal a more complex strategic environment, in which actors with differing interests cooperate around a shared objective: weakening Israel, limiting its influence, and constraining its freedom of operation in the region. israel-alma.org/turkey-in-the-…

Syria – Monthly Review (May 2026): Is the New Syria Really Stabilizing? Despite sanctions relief, growing interest from foreign investors, and improving international relations, Syria continues to grapple with weak institutions, centralized governance, persistent terrorism, sectarian tensions, and a deep social crisis. Millions of displaced people still live in camps, parliament has yet to convene, and the benefits of economic reconstruction remain out of reach for the average Syrian citizen. At the same time, Turkey and Russia continue to deepen their influence over Damascus. The key question today is not whether Syria has entered a phase of reconstruction, but whether it is capable of building a functioning and stable state. For now, it appears that the road to achieving that goal remains a long one. Read the full analysis>> israel-alma.org/monthly-review…

The latest U.S. sanctions (May 21) against senior Hezbollah and Amal officials, as well as officers in Lebanon’s security apparatuses, clarify a well-known reality: over the years, Hezbollah has built for itself a network of political, security, and economic influence within the institutions of the Lebanese state, effectively creating a state within a state. The penetration of the pro-Iranian axis into Lebanon’s security institutions, military, and political system is a central target in the struggle against Hezbollah. From Hezbollah’s perspective, any harm to its “state institutions” constitutes a red line, as reflected in Naim Qassem’s remarks on May 24, 2026. At the same time, the Lebanese government continues to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah and prefers that other countries do the work on its behalf.