What I’ve seen so far suggests that Russian troops were unaware they would be ordered to invade, and appear reluctant to prosecute this war. They don't see Ukrainians as adversaries and the military didn’t prepare them for this campaign. Outside of Chechens, morale seems low. 5/
This is an unworkable concept of operations. It seems they tried to win quickly and cheaply via 'thunder runs,' hoping to avoid the worst of sanctions & Western outrage. They’ve ended up in the worst of all worlds, trickling more resources into a failed strategy. 6/
However, this is barely a few days into the war. Ukraine has done remarkably well, but no analysts (except maybe in Moscow) expected Russia to defeat the largest country in Europe within 4 days, especially given UKR military capability. 7/
On the shambolic effort - Russian units are not really fighting as BTGs. They’re driving down roads in small detachments, pushing recon & VDV units forward. Tanks often by themselves and vice versa. Fires & enablers not used decisively, and often not used at all. 8/
Outside of the fighting NW of Kyiv we have a lot of smaller detachments, tanks, IFVs, often recon or VDV units pressing down roads & into cities. Small formations regularly outrunning logistics, without support, or letting support & artillery get ambushed behind them. 9/
Beyond large numbers of units strewn out in small detachments & checkpoints, we have the inverse situation as well. Long trains of Russian vehicles stuck in their own traffic jams, entering across the border. Air defenses not covering them, but stuck on the road with them. 10/
As companies & platoons run ahead to seize points, logistics can’t keep up, and they’re not being effectively covered by support. Most of the fights I've seen are small skirmishes, especially on the outskirts of major cities. These may be intense, but not major battles. 11/
The Russian failure is driven by the fact that they’re attempting to conduct a full-scale invasion without the mil operation that it would require, thinking they can avoid most of the fighting. This has led to not only unworkable force employment, but lack of employment. /12
The truth is that large parts of the Russian military have yet to enter this war, with many of the capabilities still unused. Not to take away from UKR great mil performance, and resilience, but I see a lot of early judgments & conclusions that need moderation. 13/
In the first 4 days, Russian tactical aviation, except for some Su-25s, largely sat on the sidelines. So have most combat helicopters. They have hundreds of both deployed in the area. Russia's air force is missing in action, and largely unused. 14/
The Russian military sought to use cruise/ballistic missiles to destroy/suppress UKR air defense and target air bases. However, they're not flying CAPs, or offensive counter air, and only today have I spotted the first Su-34 bomber conducting strikes. /15
Except for heavy shelling around Kharkiv, use of fires have been limited compared to how the Russian mil typically operates. Sadly, I think this will change. Russian mil is an artillery army first, and it has used a fraction of its available fires in this war thus far. /16