Feng Yujun, one of the China's leading Russianists and a professor at Peking University: Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine – The Economist Four reasons why Russian Federation will lose to Ukraine, according to Feng Yujun: 🔹 The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. 🔹 The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad. 🔹 The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 🔹 The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective. His conclusion is as follows: 🔸 Russia will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. 🔸 Russia's nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Feng Yujun gives the example of the United States, which left Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan with no less nuclear potential than the Russian Federation has today. 🔸 Kyiv has proven that Moscow is not invincible, so a ceasefire under the "Korean" scenario is ruled out. 🔸 The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military — for instance in Belgorod — to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events. 🔸 After the war, Ukraine will have the chance join both the EU and NATO, while Russia will lose its former Soviet republics because they see Putin's aggression there as a threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to Feng Yujun, the war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia. Source: economist.com/by-invitation/…
@Gerashchenko_en In this one, Kost Elisevich also covered the relationships with other dictators and how that isn't going as well as #Putin would like. It's part 4 of a 4-part series on "Putin's Odds" which in the long run are not good! kostelisevich.com/2024/03/11/put…
@Gerashchenko_en @Odalysk_C He's right. With support, we'll get there. But the more people globally who speak like this, the better. Anything to break the propaganda hold.
@Gerashchenko_en It's so impressive that a Peking University professor would say this. He has courage.
@Gerashchenko_en Give it up already, Ukraine is done
Gao Yusheng, former Chinese ambassador to Ukraine: the trend of the Russo-Ukrainian war and its impact on the international order Recently, the China International Finance 30 Forum and the Faculty of International Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences hosted an internal video seminar to discuss what major changes the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has brought to the global financial landscape. What will be the impact on China? How should China respond? Mr. Gao Yusheng, former ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Ukraine, spoke at the seminar, and the following is the content of his speech, which has been revised by himself. The Russo-Ukrainian war was the most important international event after the cold war, ending the post-cold war period and opening up a new international order. First, Russia's posture in this war has become increasingly passive and unfavourable, and it has shown signs of defeat. The main reasons for Russia's failure are: First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has always been in the historical process of continuous decline, and this decline is first of all a continuation of the decline of the Soviet Union before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it is also related to the mistakes of the Russian ruling clique in domestic and foreign policies. The intensification of western sanctions has exacerbated the process. the so-called rejuvenation or rejuvenation of Russia under the leadership of Putin is a false proposition that does not exist at all, and Russia's decline is manifested in its economic, military, scientific and technological, political, social and other fields, which has also had a serious negative impact on the Russian army and its combat strength. Second, the failure of Russia's Blitzkrieg and the failure to make a quick decision indicate that Russia is beginning to fail. The economic and financial power, which is extremely disproportionate to its so-called military superpower status, is really difficult to support a high-tech war that costs hundreds of millions of dollars a day. The embarrassment of the Russian army's defeat due to poverty can be seen everywhere on the battlefield. Every day of war procrastination is a heavy burden on Russia. Third, Russia's superiority over Ukraine in terms of military and economic strength has been offset by Ukraine's resolute and tenacious resistance and the huge, sustained and effective assistance of Western countries to Ukraine. The generational difference between Russia and the United States and other NATO countries in the fields of weapons technology and equipment, military concepts, and combat modes has made the advantages and disadvantages of the two sides more prominent. Fourth, modern warfare is bound to be a hybrid war, covering military, economic, political, diplomatic, public opinion, propaganda, intelligence, information and other fields. Russia is not only passive on the battlefield, but has lost in other areas. This determines that it is only a matter of time before Russia is finally defeated. Fifth, it is up to Russia when and how this war will end. Russia's desire to end the war as soon as possible under conditions of ensuring the main vested results has been frustrated. In this sense, Russia has lost its strategic leadership and initiative. Second, the intensity and intensity of confrontation in the next stage of this war may be further enhanced. The possibility of expansion and upgrading is not excluded. This is because the goals of all parties are diametrically opposed and in opposite directions. Ensuring the ownership of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas is clearly Russia's bottom line. Ukraine will not make concessions to Russia on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and is determined to recover Eastern Ukraine and Crimea through war. The United States, NATO and the European Union have repeatedly affirmed their determination to defeat Putin. Sullivan, assistant to the president for national security affairs, recently emphasised three goals for the United States in the Russo-Ukrainian war: first, an independent and free Ukraine; second, a weakened and isolated Russia; and third, a strong, united and determined West. In order to achieve these goals, the United States, NATO and EU countries not only significantly increased their efforts to aid Ukraine, but also passed the aid to Ukraine lend-lease act for the first time after World War II. The United States has internationalised and institutionalised aid to Ukraine through the forty-first conference of defence ministers. More importantly, the direct participation of the United States, Britain, and other countries in the war is deepening and expanding in scope. All this shows that this war will be fought until Russia is defeated and punished. The Russo-Ukrainian war and the new international order. The Russo-Ukrainian war completely ended the Yalta system and the remnants of the cold war, and the world began to move toward a new pattern and order of international relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the status of a permanent member of the United Nations security council and the military superpower status of the Soviet Union; Russia continued and retained a large amount of the legacy and influence of the former Soviet Union in terms of domestic politics, economy, society, culture and ideology; and Russia's foreign policy was a mixture of the former Soviet Union and the Tsarist Empire. The core and primary direction of the Putin regime's foreign policy is to regard the former Soviet Union as its exclusive sphere of influence and restore the empire by relying on the integration mechanism in various fields dominated by Russia. To this end, Russia is duplicitous, reneges on its promises, and has never really recognized the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other former Soviet States, and has frequently violated their territory and sovereignty. This is the greatest threat to peace, security and stability in the Eurasian region. The Russo-Ukrainian war greatly changed this situation. After Ukraine's independence, especially since 2000, the two factions advocating East and West in Ukraine were generally evenly matched, and they took turns in power through elections. After Russia annexed Crimea and occupied Eastern Ukraine in 2014, anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine rose and pro-Russian forces began to shrink. Most Ukrainians, not only in the West but also in the East, support the country's accession to the European Union and NATO. After the outbreak of this war, the situation in Ukraine has undergone fundamental changes, now there are no parties, regions, or classes in Ukraine, the entire country is united to resist Russia and save the country. It can be said that Russia has completely lost Ukraine. At the same time, the countries of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of Belarus, including the members of the collective security treaty and the Eurasian economic union, refused to support Russia. Russia's defeat in the war will completely deprive it of the possibility of reorganising the old mountains and rivers and restoring the empire. In order to gain the international status and influence of the Tsarist Empire or the former Soviet Union, to break the existing international order, and to change the geopolitical map of Eurasia and the world, Russia has a persistent pursuit of reasserting the former Soviet States and restoring alliances or empires. This is a fundamental confrontation and conflict with the United States and the West. This is the main contradiction and crux of Russia's relations with the United States and the West. To a large extent, the contest and struggle between the two sides on this issue is a continuation and aftersound of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it also has certain ideological overtones. Through this war, this confrontation and struggle between Russia and the United States and the west ended in the complete defeat of Russia. This also ended the post-cold war or the continuation of the cold war. Several possible points of the evolution of the international order after the Russo-Ukrainian war: 1. Russia will be significantly weakened, isolated and punished in terms of politics, economy, military and diplomacy. Russia's power will be even weaker. Russia has been excluded from a number of important international organisations and the international status of Russia has been significantly reduced. 2. Ukraine will break away from Russia's orbit and sphere of influence (if Russia still has a sphere of influence) and become a member of the European family, that is, a member of the West. 3. Other former soviet countries may have new de-russification trends of varying degrees, and some countries will be more active in moving West. 4. While completely freeing themselves from the constraints of the defeated countries in World War II and accelerating the development of armaments, Japan and Germany will more actively strive for the status of political powers. However, it will not break away from the Western camp, nor will it completely turn its back on the policy of peaceful development. 5. The United States and other Western countries will vigorously promote substantive reform of the United Nations and other important international organisations, and if reform is blocked, it may also start another stove. Both may draw a line with the ideology of so-called democracy and freedom, excluding some countries such as Russia. The original article captured by web archive: archive.ph/5yeZp#selectio…
@Gerashchenko_en 100% correct, and add Ukrainian advantages in technological innovation, and the speed at which innovations become combat effective
@Gerashchenko_en Russia is like a legacy creaking corporate, run by mercenaries, Ukraine is like a nimble, innovative start up of missionaries. Only one winner.
@Gerashchenko_en The Nuclear arms perspective is interesting, America had them and didn’t use them in Vietnam, Korea or Afghanistan, Russia still has them but..? Would they work if called upon and would Putin, when cornered and facing the inevitable seek to use them in a final act of desperation?
@Gerashchenko_en Full article here 👇
@Gerashchenko_en Putins system for correcting errors