The debate on globalization (and on deglobalization) would benefit from a bit closer examination of the data on actual trade flows (Chinese trade jumped in the pandemic) + recognition that most measures of globalization have been massive distorted by tax avoidance ... 1/
I certainly hope Niall Ferguson's Bloomberg column sparks a broad recognition that contemporary globalization isn't simply the result of technology and the removal of trade barriers -- it was also spurred by tax (large) distortions. 2/ bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
I at least don't think it is possible to look at say Ireland's measured goods trade (especially the measure used in the balance of payments) over the last ten years and see a simple story of a healthy increase in cross border integration ... 3/
And while there is a tendency to interpret the growth in global services trade (setting aside the slowdown in tourism and travel in the pandemic) as evidence of the resilience of globalization, I at least interpret Ireland's surging trade in services rather differently 4/
Similarly, should the surge in China's exports (v its GDP) from 2002 to 2008 be seen as healthy integration, or evidence that China's exchange rate was wildly undervalued? (the PBOC was buying over 10% of China's GDP in the market to keep the CNY down by the way after 06) 5/
Fergusson's column reminded me that global imbalances and (not coincidentally cross border capital flows) peaked before the global crisis. Was that healthy financial market integration, or distortions from lax global bank regulation and a massive surge in reserve accumulation?
I at least don't think you can tell a story about financial globalization without recognizing the massive role non-market flows have played in the cross border flow of capital over the last twenty years ... 7/